While attending a Working Group during my deployment to Romania, my fellow Field Grade Officers and I were discussing the Initial Operating Capabilities (IOC) and Full Operating Capabilities (FOC) for our Tactical Command Posts (TAC) within the context of Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). As we discussed these capabilities, we briefly touched on the criteria to begin breaking down our TAC and conduct a survivability move to a new location. Was this going to be initiated by the discovery of enemy reconnaissance forces near our location? What about if we intercepted enemy radio communications discussing our location or disposition? Or are we waiting until fired upon by enemy artillery or direct fire weapons systems before we decide to jump to a new area? While we went back and forth on this topic, my mind drifted to a galaxy far, far away to better visualize these criteria.
In Star Wars Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back, the Rebel Alliance hid from the Galactic Empire by establishing a base on the remote planet of Hoth. The Galactic Empire sent out Imperial probe droids to scan surrounding planets for signs of Rebel activity. After Han Solo and Chewbacca engaged the probe droid (with it subsequently self-destructing), they (correctly) concluded it had already given away their position, so General Rieekan ordered the evacuation of the base. Having found a shield generator on Hoth, the probe droid had already relayed the information back to the Imperial Fleet, where Darth Vader ordered Admiral Ozzel to “Set your course for the Hoth System.” Instead of waiting for the Imperial Fleet to arrive or for the ground assault to begin, General Rieekan chose the identification of enemy reconnaissance assets in their area to begin degrading his command post’s capabilities in preparation to move to a new location.
As an avid fan of books which meld science fiction / fantasy and military doctrine, such as Strategy Strikes Back: How Star Wars Explains Modern Military Conflict, Winning Westeros: How Game of Thrones Explains Modern Military Conflict, and To Boldly Go: Leadership, Strategy, and Conflict in the 21st Century and Beyond, not to mention the works on this site, I am always looking at ways to connect pop culture to military doctrine to better facilitate operational understanding amongst my seniors, peers, and subordinates. While many might not have understood the importance of the prolonged defensive stand by Ukrainian Forces in Bahkmut, they can certainly relate to the Uruk-Hai Army attriting themselves against the Deeping Wall during the Battle of the Hornburg in The Two Towers. If the Russian Army and Private Military Contractor (PMC) Wagner were going to send wave after wave of mobiks (mobilized troops) and convicts against entrenched defensive positions, as King Théoden would say, they are going to “break upon this fortress like water on rock.” Whether it is through books, movies, or television series, using pop culture to effectively communicate doctrine can proactively generate potential lessons learned and successfully develop those around you through avenues which are much more engaging than official service publications alone.
Being a military intelligence officer, I am well aware of the stereotypes associated with my profession. But instead of keeping my extracurricular hobbies of science fiction, fantasy, miniature wargaming, and tabletop roleplaying close-hold in order to maintain a social life, I have leaned into it for the betterment of the Army. Any time you can make comparisons that can help others visualize the situation, then your organization is going to be more the better for it. The Russian Federation’s disinformation and destabilization campaign previously used in Ukraine and currently being executed in Moldova? Sounds strikingly similar to how Tyranids in the Warhammer 40k Universe infiltrate, destabilize, and eventually consume a planet. With the Division once again being the unit of action, in order to show how to ineffectively use your Division Cavalry (DIVCAV), look no further than the Dothraki horde during the Battle of Winterfell; in Game of Thrones’ third episode of season eight, The Long Night, the living lost their entire ground reconnaissance and screening element in a careless full frontal charge against a wall of undead wights. And for forward operating units, such as when the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was in Romania and the 4th Infantry Division was in Poland, one only has to look at Star Trek: Deep Space Nine for lessons learned. As Captain Benjamin Sisko discovered across seven seasons, alliances and partnerships are everything in the current operational environment, and we need to always be identifying and re-assessing indicators and warnings of potential escalation by our adversaries (be it Russian, Chinese, or Cardassian).
And these comparisons come up more often, and are sometimes much more relevant, than we would initially think. Going back to TAC and Tactical Operations Center (TOC) jumps, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, General James C. McConville, told Army leaders, “we are going to make you move all the time” and “don’t get excited if we are moving you every two hours.” As the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) moved forward on Command Post Survivability as part of our Task Force Future Fight initiative, I couldn’t help but connect this frequency of movement to Battlestar Galactica. In the first episode of the 2004 incarnation of the series, 33, the crew of the Galactica must use their faster-than-light (FTL) drive to jump to a new location every 33 minutes in order to evade their Cylon pursuers. After being hunted for more than 130 hours and completing 237 FTL jumps while still manning their battle stations, the crew of the Galactica are well-past sleep deprivation and have reached their breaking point.
Although we hopefully won’t be moving every half hour, how is the US Army going to mitigate such a problem in LSCO? Bringing this up to the G2 and our Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Chief, a positive discussion ensued about the issue and potential ways to ensure the command post is not combat ineffective from exhaustion after a few days. We discussed the potential for additional smaller TACs to maintain the fight while one rests in a secured location. We talked about how command posts could use minimal communications for a short time, allowing them to emit a much smaller signature on the Electromagnetic Spectrum and get some rest for their personnel. The point is, by using this pop culture reference as a jumping off point (no pun intended), it facilitated our understanding of the unanticipated problem set and the follow-on discussion developed potential solutions.
In a more recent example, during the movie Barbie, Ken takes the opportunity to install a patriarchal society in Barbieland after they go to the “Real World.” Upon returning to Barbieland, Barbie, with the help of Gloria and Sasha, defeats the Kensurgency by both physically and mentally separating the other Barbies from the Kens. Although I did not see Counterinsurgency Barbie in the film, the team clearly had read Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, as they excelled at separating the population from the Kensurgents. If Barbie can teach lessons which took the US Army years to learn, understand, and implement, I think we are on the right track in bringing outside perspectives to the development table.
[Editor’s Note: if someone wants to write about COIN in Barbie, please write to me ASAP]
So why is this topic so important to me? Because leaders should never discourage self-development solely due to the unconventional nature of the topic. Just because they are unfamiliar with the subject matter does not mean it cannot provide doctrinal and educational value to others. When I was the Committee Chief for the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course (MICCC), one of the most requested course changes by our students was to write one of their essays on a fictional battle; in lieu of writing about the principles of mission command exercised by Alexander the Great at Gaugamela or Major General Ulysses S. Grant at Shiloh, students preferred to write about Sky Marshal Dienes’ (failed) command during the Battle of Klendathu (Starship Troopers) or Lord Tyrion Lannister’s defense of King’s Landing during the Battle of the Blackwater (Game of Thrones). I immediately approved this request, with the explicit instructions that while the topic may have changed, the standards did not. When the first batch of papers were submitted under the new curriculum, students took full advantage of the change to write about an enjoyable topic (to them, at least) while still identifying the principles of mission command and adhering to Army professional writing standards. While some of my instructors were not as enthused about the change, the students loved it, taking the opportunity to write about the Day of Black Sun (Avatar: The Last Airbender) or the Battle for Hillsbrad (World of Warcraft); because of how much effort these students put into their papers and how good they were in adhering to the assignment instructions, I still keep copies of these essays as examples of how pop culture and professional development can co-exist to the benefit of our Army.
This is equally important to me because, as a firm believer in professional development and this great army, I am concerned there may be a misunderstanding by senior leaders in the United States Military on where Servicemembers are getting their information. I was recently submitted for admission into a prestigious writing guild based on some of my recent articles combining pop culture and military doctrine, but denied this honor because the articles “did not contribute sufficiently to the body of knowledge.” While this was certainly a little disappointing, given the number of people who read the articles and who discussed them (either with me directly or amongst my peers), I have to question if publication in Parameters, Military Review, or even branch-specific journals, such as Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB), should still be the benchmark to what contributes to the professional dialogue. I ravenously consume military reading lists just as much as the next Field Grade Officer, but for every literary or educational gem such as Destined for War, Ghost Fleet, or The Kill Chain, there are outdated, pretentious, and/or superficially erudite choices which add little to nothing to the professional dialogue (I’m looking at you, A Message to Garcia). During the Army Leader Exchange’s Marchmaster’s Championship bracket to determine the best creator of Army content, half of the entire bracket was non-Army and individual content creators, further demonstrating the desire for and popularity of enjoyable yet still developmental material.
I will end with one of my favorite stories from when I was the Committee Chief for the MICCC. While working in my office, I heard a debate slowly escalating between two of my instructors. As the argument grew increasingly louder, I rushed over to them, demanding to know the issue that had led to them almost coming to blows with one another. One of my senior instructors immediately shouted, “John doesn’t think that Iron Man was the main effort during (Avengers) Endgame, but instead just a supporting effort! Can you believe that?!?” After my initial confusion over how this topic had gotten them to this point, we all sat down and they presented their cases to the rest of the instructors in the bullpen; to be impartial to the debate, the opposing viewpoint was Tony Stark / Iron Man was the supporting effort because he was getting the Infinity Gauntlet to Bruce Banner / Hulk (main effort) for him to use. Regardless of who was right or wrong, this led to a fantastic discussion about FM 3-0, Operations, what constitutes the main effort versus a supporting effort, and how these can change in different phases throughout a battle.
Science fiction and fantasy are not going to win future wars for the United States Army and watching all 47 seasons of Star Trek series does not alone constitute “professional development,” but pop culture can certainly help us gain understanding, develop future leaders, and generate potential solutions for the battles ahead of us. In lieu of serving as a roadblock to this trove of unconventional knowledge, senior military leaders should accept it, even embrace it, and make it part of relevant discussions when available. The Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Band of Brothers (book and miniseries), and This Kind of War are never going to be removed from the pantheon of professional development material (and they shouldn’t be), but there is certainly a place for Firefly, The Dresden Files, and Game of Thrones alongside them. So say we all.
About the Author: Major Robert A. Calkins is an officer in the United States Army and currently serving as the S2 for the 101st Airborne Division Artillery at Fort Campbell, KY. He has previously served as the Committee Chief for the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course, as well as the Executive Officer and Operations Officer for the 309th Military Intelligence Battalion. He is prepared to argue that the first Multi-Domain Operation (MDO), and the associated Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), was conducted by the forces of Mordor at the Battle of the Pelennor Fields during the Third Age and not by the British at Cambrai in 1917.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, the U.S. government, Starfleet, or any other intergovernmental or interplanetary organization, real or otherwise.
Cover Image courtesy Lucasfilm Ltd.
The Angry Staff Officer 
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